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Introduction
 Over the past decade, the Portuguese 
government has sponsored a major investment 
in renewable and emerging electricity-
generation technologies and sold its ownership 
in electricity companies to private businesses. 
The mixed results of these two changes have 
been succinctly chronicled by international 
news headlines. Commenting on renewable 
electricity investment begun in 2005, Rosenthal 
of the New York Times reported, “Portugal 
Gives Itself a Clean-Energy Makeover.” By 2013 
that makeover had developed into a success 
story, and Koronowski of ThinkProgress lauded 
Portugal’s renewable electricity sector with the 
headline, “Is 70% Renewable Power Possible? 
Portugal Just Did It for 3 Months.” By the 
next year, however, a headline published by 
analysts Garcia and colleagues at Fitch Ratings 
revealed an underlying problem: “Electricity 
Tariff Deficits Peaking in Spain and Portugal.” 
An electricity tariff deficit is the amount of 
revenue the government guarantees electricity 
generators less the amount they earn from 
selling electricity at the market price; and 
from 2007 to 2014 the government’s debt had 
accumulated to over €4 billion (Garcia et al.). 
 The time correlation between high 
levels of electricity generated from renewable 
technologies and the revelation of the massive 
government debt has led critics to question 
the financial viability of future investments 
in renewable electricity technologies. In 
tacit agreement, the Portuguese government 
has recently reduced subsidies to renewable 
technologies and has placed a moratorium 
on the installation of new wind turbines. 
Although these efforts to curb the costs 
associated with renewable electricity should 
help the government reduce its debt, the 
reduced support for renewable technology 
may jeopardize the country’s ability to meet 
its assigned goals for renewable energy and 
efficiency for 2020 and beyond. Furthermore, 
the subsidization of renewable technology is 
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not the only driving factor underlying the debt 
(“30 Years…,” pp. 107–13). The government 
also subsidizes a nonrenewable technology 
called combined heating and power (CHP), 
guarantees revenue to all generation facilities 
established prior to 2007 as a result of 
electricity sector restructuring, and regulates 
prices. 
 In this article I explore the evolution of 
the Portuguese electricity sector in order to 
determine the extent to which subsidization of 
renewable electricity-generation technologies, 
CHP technology, electricity sector restructuring, 
and price regulation have contributed to the 
development of the electricity tariff debt. I then 
consider upcoming changes in the Portuguese 
electricity system: construction of more than a 
dozen new hydroelectric dams is already under 
way, and price regulation is scheduled to be 
phased out by the end of 2015. I conclude with 
an assessment of Portugal’s electricity sector as 
a system and prospects for its financial viability.
Electricity System Structure  
and Development
  Physical Structure  
and Provision
 Businesses and households in developed 
countries have access to a constant supply 
of electricity that is provided through three 
physical stages—generation, transmission, and 
distribution—and a fourth separate business 
stage called retail (Linden et al., pp. 9, 61). 
High-voltage electricity is traditionally created 
at large fossil fuel–burning facilities, nuclear 
facilities, and hydroelectric dams. In the past 
two decades, the amount of electricity generated 
by technologies that harness renewable energy 
sources (RESs), such as wind turbines and 
photovoltaic cells, has rapidly increased as 
these technologies have become more cost 
effective. When built, a generation facility 
is classified by its capacity, or the maximum 
number of megawatts (MW) of electricity it can 
produce in one hour of operation. However, a 
facility is rarely run at maximum, so electricity 
production is measured by the number of 
hours a facility operates, in MW-hours (MWh). 
One million MWh comprise one terawatt-hour 
(TWh); TWh is used to report the electricity 
consumption of a country. For a renewable 
facility, such as a hydroelectric dam or wind 
turbine, the MWh of generation is highly 
dependent on the weather but is nearly costless 
to operate, whereas a fossil fuel facility can 
be utilized at any time but at the price of the 
coal, oil, or gas on which it runs. To transport 
electricity to the consumer, the transmission 
stage is comprised of a network of power 
lines that carry the high-voltage electricity to 
substations, where it is converted to the low 
voltage required in residential and commercial 
settings. Usable low-voltage electricity is then 
distributed through neighborhood power 
lines, which carry the electricity to the final 
consumer. Payment is coordinated by the retail 
companies, which compensate the generation, 
transmission, and distribution companies for 
the electricity the final consumers use, and 
then recoup these costs and their own profits 
by billing those consumers (“Electricity”).
 Coordination across the separate stages 
is essential because there is no efficient way to 
store electricity; so if generators fail to meet 
real-time consumer demand or if there is a 
disconnect between any of the stages, a blackout 
may occur. Therefore, systems vary in terms 
of the ownership and organization of the four 
stages. In some systems, a single entity controls 
all the stages, whereas in other systems separate 
entities are responsible for each stage. National 
governments often attempt to streamline 
coordination among each of the four stages 
by purchasing the companies at each stage 
and consolidating them into a single state-
run firm. This structure, known as a vertically 
integrated monopoly (VIM), theoretically 
solves the coordination problem by allowing 
electricity to be delivered to consumers 
through an integrated and contracted supply 
chain at a price set by the government 
(“Electricity”). For most European nations, a 
VIM structure predominantly supplied by fossil 
fuel generators was the norm throughout 
much of the twentieth century (Linden et al., 
p. 9). Portugal maintained such a government-
owned VIM electricity system structure until 
2000 (“ANNEX II…,” p. 5).
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  1973: A Catalyst for Restructuring 
and Renewables
 The 1973 OPEC oil embargo caused a 
drastic increase in inflation and unemployment 
in the United States that sent shockwaves 
through Europe and initiated a global 
recession. As a US ally, Portugal was one of 
four additional nations specifically targeted 
by the embargo and found itself severely 
impacted due to its lack of indigenous fossil 
fuel resources (“Milestones…”). This catalyzed 
European leaders to critically examine fossil 
fuel intensive industries; their investigations 
concluded that the security of electricity 
supply was jeopardized by three ubiquitous 
issues. The most obvious issue was one of 
dependence: electricity generation required 
massive fossil fuel inputs, and most countries 
relied on less politically stable suppliers, the 
OPEC nations or Russia. Lacking their own 
endowment of fossil fuels, a proliferation of 
renewable electricity-generation facilities was 
the only way to wean this dependence; hence, 
a driver for RES investment was born. The 
second issue was isolation: in the event that 
one nation was suffering an electricity shortage 
while its neighbors had a surplus, there was no 
way for that extra electricity to be transferred 
to the deficient country. To facilitate this 
type of transaction, the electricity grids 
would have to be physically and financially 
connected. The third issue was the VIM 
structure, because it inhibited the resolution 
of the first two issues (Czeberkus, pp. 11–19). 
Under umbrella ownership, the transmission 
and distribution stages were contractually 
obligated to meet all retail requests with the 
electricity generated by the state facilities. This 
eliminated residual demand for potential new 
generation companies, renewable or otherwise. 
Furthermore, the state-owned systems were 
constructed to provide electricity for their 
own country. Thus, with no export market, 
there was no incentive for investment in 
interconnection. Dismantling a VIM structure 
requires three processes: separating ownership 
of each stage, known as unbundling; selling 
the state-owned components of the system to 
private ownership, known as privatization; and 
facilitating the entrance of more generation 
and retail companies to enable consumers to 
choose with whom they do business, known as 
liberalization. However, dismantling the VIM 
structure also dismantles the coordination of 
the integrated supply chain, so an alternative 
method of coordinating electricity exchange is 
needed to facilitate seamless provision (Linden 
et al., pp. 9, 61). 
 The value of a competitive market and 
physically connected grids was formally 
recognized in 1996 when the European Union 
(EU) issued the first Internal Market Directive. 
This legislation detailed EU expectations for 
unbundling, privatization, and liberalization 
as well as prescribing a framework for the 
creation of an electricity exchange market to 
replace the VIM supply chain (“EU Action on 
Climate”). The envisioned exchange would 
function as a competitive market in which 
the laws of supply and demand would dictate 
electricity sales rather than contracts. In 
this type of organization, each of the many 
generation companies lists the quantity and 
cost of electricity available, while retailers 
report how much electricity the consumers 
require. The least expensive electricity is used 
to meet the reported demand first, followed by 
the next cheapest, and so on, until the total 
demand is fulfilled. Thus, the electricity is used 
in ascending cost order. The price is set by the 
cost of the last unit of electricity needed to meet 
the reported demand. Any additional, more 
expensive capacity that is not needed to meet 
demand goes unused, and the generator is not 
compensated. This type of wholesale market 
functions as an auction between generators 
and retail companies in which generation 
companies are incentivized to create electricity 
as inexpensively as possible so that theirs is 
used first, resulting in a higher profit margin 
and lower overall price. The transmission and 
distribution stages simply serve as a conduit 
between the two. The presence of many 
retail companies drives competition because 
it enables consumers to switch between 
retailers if one becomes inefficient or tries to 
charge a higher premium over the wholesale 
price. Ideally, with competition and financial 
exchanges, price is minimized and efficiency is 
maximized (Linden et al., pp. 9–16). 
 Investing in RES was declared an 
EU priority in 2001, and a legally binding 
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commitment was made in 2008 when the 
European Commission passed the first 
unilateral emissions reduction and renewable 
technology commitment in the world, known 
as the EU 2020 Climate and Energy Package. 
The 2020 Package specified that EU nations 
increase the amount of energy derived 
from RES to 20 percent and improve their 
efficiency of energy use by 20 percent by the 
year 2020, along with several other goals. The 
2020 Package also updated the structure and 
connectivity directives with more stringent 
requirements. To reach the EU-wide 20 
percent RES goal, each member nation was 
assigned a unique RES percentage target, 
relative to its economic strength and endowed 
renewable potential. This placed Portugal in 
a contradictory situation: the country’s GDP 
per capita ranks in the bottom half of the EU, 
but its endowed physical geography of strong 
rivers and a windswept interior make it rich in 
the natural resources that enable RES success. 
The latter was deemed more significant, 
and Portugal was tasked with generating 31 
percent of its total energy consumption from 
RES, which ranked in the top quarter of all 
EU nations. Energy consumption is classified 
by the purpose for which it is used: electricity, 
heating and cooling, or transportation; and 
EU nations autonomously determine an RES 
target for each of the three categories. A 
majority of nations planned to fulfill most of 
their RES target by increasing the use of RESs 
in electricity production. Portugal proposed to 
achieve its 31 percent overall RES in energy 
target by generating 60 percent of electricity 
from RES (RES-E), increasing RES in heating 
and cooling (RES-H&C) to 30 percent, and 
gaining the remaining 10 percent from RES in 
transportation (Rosenthal). 
The Portuguese Scenario
 Until 1993 the Portuguese electricity 
sector was structured as a completely 
government-owned VIM, under the name 
Energias de Portugal (EDP); and electricity 
was generated via 4,307 MW of fossil fuel 
capacity and 4,174 MW of hydroelectric 
capacity, respectively contributing 69 percent 
and 28 percent of the 38.5 TWh demanded 
with negligible imports (International Energy 
Agency [IEA]; “ANNEX II…,” pp. 15–16). Thus, 
the EU Internal Market Directive of 1996 and 
RES Directive of 2001 required fundamental 
changes in the Portuguese electricity sector. 
However, as one of the nations targeted 
by the OPEC oil embargo, the Portuguese 
government was acutely aware of the need for 
reform; so it issued its own national directives 
in advance of the two EU Directives. In terms 
of RES-E, Portugal began to offer a group of 
technologies, called the “special regime,” a 
feed-in tariff (FiT), or guaranteed payment for 
each MWh of electricity generated, in 1988 
(“30 Years…,” p. 107). In terms of market 
restructuring, unbundling and privatization 
began in 1993, when EDP allowed the foreign 
company International Power (IP) to buy two 
new fossil fuel generation facilities. Generation 
was fully unbundled from transmission by 
2000, but a fully functional wholesale market 
did not come to fruition until 2007. This 
gap forced the Portuguese government to 
guarantee revenue to all of EDP’s and IP’s 
facilities established prior to 2007 (“ANNEX 
II…,” pp. 1–3, 14). Renewable proliferation 
was more successful than liberalization; and 
by the end of 2013 the electricity sector had 
four main generation companies and ten main 
retail companies (Council of European Energy 
Regulators [CEER], pp. 51–52). Electricity was 
generated via 7,388 MW of fossil fuel capacity 
and 10,302 MW of renewable technology, 
which respectively accounted for 33 percent 
and 63 percent of the 49.1 TWh demanded 
that year, with less than two percent of 
electricity imported from Spain (IEA). Portugal 
has surpassed its 2020 RES goal, and this 
evolution of RES-E is displayed in Figure 1, 
with installed capacity of each technology 
type in MW displayed in the left panel and the 
actual amount of electricity generated by each 
technology type in TWh displayed in the right 
panel.
 As discussed previously, RES-E success 
was concurrent with delays in market reform, 
and both of these factors contributed to the 
development of a €4 billion tariff debt. This 
tariff debt has accumulated from successive 
years of tariff deficit, which occurs when there 
is a shortfall between the revenue that electricity 
generators are guaranteed less the amount that 
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they receive. The Portuguese electricity sector 
has functioned as an idealized wholesale market 
since 2007 in that retailers pay the generators 
the wholesale price for the quantity of electricity 
they need. The market deviates from the ideal in 
that retailers are also obligated to pay generators 
any guaranteed revenue, the aforementioned 
FiT and revenue guarantee, to which they are 
entitled. As a result, the wholesale price of 
electricity may not reflect the price retailers 
pay many of the generators. Retail companies, 
in theory, recoup all of this cost by billing 
customers, but there is a limit to how much 
Portuguese retailers can charge for electricity. 
This price cap is set by the Energy System 
Regulatory Authority, which was established to 
oversee the restructuring process and prohibit 
electricity retailers from charging unfair prices. 
When this cap is binding, that is, when the price 
cap does not fully cover the wholesale price 
plus the entitled revenue, retailers are only 
able to buy electricity from generators at a loss, 
so instead they choose to exit the market. To 
guarantee electricity provision, the Portuguese 
government requires the former VIM retail 
company, EDP Serviço Universal (EDP-SU), to 
purchase electricity from the generators and 
supply it to consumers even when the price 
cap is binding. EDP-SU is supposed to remain 
financially solvent because the Portuguese 
government has pledged to reimburse the 
retailer for any losses by increasing the price 
cap the following year (Linden et al., pp. 9–11, 
30–31). 
 During 2007–2014, the price cap 
did become binding, but the Portuguese 
government refused to raise prices because the 
Portuguese economy was in a severe recession. 
As a poorer EU nation, electricity costs 
represent a higher share of average household 
income than in other EU countries; and with 
skyrocketing unemployment and faltering 
growth, the Portuguese government refused to 
further burden its citizens with a higher price 
for the basic necessity of electricity. The result 
was the growing tariff deficit in each year that 
was driven by the guaranteed revenues from FiTs 
and by the pre-2007 generators (Linden et al., 
pp. 30–31). In the following sections, I explore 
the motivation for the guaranteed revenues and 
the degree to which each has contributed to the 
debt.
Figure 1
Evolution of Electricity Installation and Generation
Source: International Energy Agency; Garcia et al.; Peña et al.
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  Special Regime Subsidies:  
The Double-edged Sword of Success
 Portugal planned to meet its lofty 2020 
targets of 60 percent RES-E, 30 percent RES-
H&C, and a 20 percent increase in efficiency 
primarily with a proliferation of wind turbines 
and CHP facilities. These two technologies 
are classified as the “special regime,” which 
benefits owners by guaranteeing that the 
electricity these facilities produce will be 
purchased at all times irrespective of demand 
at a predetermined, above-market price, the 
FiT. Large hydroelectric dams are a renewable 
source of electricity generation but are not 
included in the special regime because they 
are cost-competitive with fossil fuel facilities 
(“30 Years…,” pp. 111–13). Wind and CHP 
are the most relevant technologies in terms 
of the yearly tariff deficit because the other 
special regime technologies (e.g., biofuels, 
photovoltaic cells, and tidal power) account for 
less than ten percent of electricity generation 
(IEA).
 Relative to the other special regime 
technologies, wind turbines are the closest to 
being cost competitive with fossil fuel facilities. 
Therefore, in addition to offering a FiT in 
1988, the Portuguese government created 
several grant programs to further incentivize 
investors. From 2005 to 2014, the FiT was 
approximately €74 per MWh to €104 per MWh 
and guaranteed that all electricity generated 
would be purchased at that price for the first 
15 years of facility operation. With average 
wholesale prices for electricity for the same 
timeframe about €50 per MWh, the Portuguese 
government was obligated to pay turbine 
owners €25 to €55 (“30 Years…,” pp. 107–11). 
 According to the initial 15-year subsidy 
scheme, since the first wind-driven electricity-
generation facility was completed in 1992, its 
FiT was guaranteed until 2006. After this year 
the turbine owners would receive the wholesale 
market price only if their generation cost 
ranked low enough in the ascending cost order. 
However, updates to the compensation scheme 
included extensions to the FiTs for older wind 
facilities, such that the first will not expire 
until 2020 (Peña et al., p. 354). Under this 
generous and stable regulatory environment, 
installed wind power more than doubled from 
2,150 MW in 2007 to 4,742 MW in 2014, which 
currently provides nearly one-quarter of the 
electricity generation (IEA). While this jump in 
installed capacity was the goal, the government 
liabilities to wind turbine owners also roughly 
doubled, and the extension of the FiT to the 
earliest wind turbine owners further added to 
these liabilities (“30 Years…,” p. 107).
 In an effort to immediately offset the 
tariff debt, the Portuguese government made 
a further amendment to the FiT scheme in 
2013. Wind park owners were able to maintain 
the current FiT arrangement or to select one 
of two options: pay the government $6,700 
(approximately €5,400) per MW installed for 
eight years and in return receive an extension 
of the FiT for five years, or pay the government 
$7,500 (approximately €6,000) per MW installed 
for eight years and receive an extension of the 
FiT for seven years (Peña et al., p. 354). If the 
oldest park participates in one of the extension 
options, the FiT and purchase guarantee could 
last until 2026, which is nearly a decade longer 
than the initial scheme specified. Although 
both of these options provide the government 
with a yearly influx of extra revenue with which 
to repay EDP-SU, in return the government 
must provide a longer period of FiT payments 
to the generators themselves, which is a driving 
factor of the current debt. In fact, analysis in 
2014 by Peña and colleagues concluded that 
this new scheme will increase the tariff debt due 
to the longer FiT period. Peña and colleagues 
also found that wind facilities can be cost-
competitive with fossil fuel facilities after just 
seven years of FiT subsidy. If the FiT scheme 
for wind turbines were reduced to seven years 
rather than the current range of 15 to 24 years, 
the level of wind subsidy payments would be 
greatly reduced. In support of the conclusions 
of Peña and colleagues, a study by Portugal’s 
Secretary of State for Energy suggests that 
wind generators have been significantly over-
subsidized, perhaps up to 20 percent of the 
tariff deficit in any year (“Rents…,” p. 55). 
 The second of the two significant special 
regime technologies, CHP, is used to produce 
heat in commercial settings but also increases 
the efficiency of energy use by harnessing the 
waste heat to generate electricity. Both fossil 
fuels and renewables can be used as the initial 
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energy source for CHP facilities, and in Portugal 
roughly 80 percent of CHP facilities use natural 
gas. Despite this reliance on fossil fuels, the 
Portuguese government and EU policymakers 
wanted to promote CHP because it contributed 
to the RESs and efficiency goals. It was also 
hoped that investment and proliferation of 
CHP would lead to cost-reducing innovations. 
The subsidy scheme did succeed in promoting 
the proliferation of CHP facilities: FiTs paid 
to CHP plants were approximately €25 per 
MWh to €50 per MWh above market price, and 
generation from all CHP facilities increased 
from five percent of total electricity demand in 
2000 to 14 percent in 2014. With a comparable 
premium to wind turbines, combined heat and 
power facilities also require a large government 
subsidy, but the cost of CHP facilities has 
not fallen much. With this lack of progress, 
the EU as a whole repealed the directive to 
promote the technology; and the Portuguese 
government cut subsidies to CHP facilities in 
late 2012 (“Final Cogeneration…,” pp. 5–11).
 Initial promotion of wind and combined 
heat and power facilities was effective at 
stimulating installation; however, it is clear that 
both technologies were over-subsidized, leaving 
the government with an expensive and growing 
liability. The Secretary of State for Energy 
estimates that payments to wind turbines 
and CHP facilities comprised approximately 
37 percent of the tariff debt accrued by 2011, 
with the former contributing about 19 percent 
and the latter about 18 percent (“Rents…,” 
pp. 13–14). These cost estimates illustrate 
the dual nature of subsidy programs: the 
more successful they are, the more expensive 
they become, particularly when the subsidy is 
overly generous. Clearly both the subsidies for 
wind turbines and combined heat and power 
facilities have significantly contributed to the 
tariff debt, but the remaining 60 percent of 
the debt accrued by 2011 has a different cause 
(“Rents…,” p. 17). 
  The Consequences of  
Piecemeal Unbundling
 The Internal Market Directive to 
restructure the government-owned VIM was 
intended to eliminate government involvement, 
but the process of moving to a competitive 
system was not nearly as smooth as policymakers 
envisioned. Therefore, government intervention 
was necessary to complete the process. EDP 
officially unbundled its ownership and legal 
control of transmission from the generation 
and retail stages in 2000 through the creation 
of an independent transmission company, 
Redes Energéticas Nacionais. In the idealized 
framework, a wholesale market through which 
generators and retailers trade electricity would 
be created simultaneously. However, creation 
of the wholesale market was delayed for seven 
years. In the interim the two generation 
companies, IP and the newly unbundled EDP, 
established a purchase power agreement 
(PPA) with the transmission company for each 
generation facility. These contracts guaranteed 
a level of revenue for each facility in exchange 
for immediate delivery of any amount of 
electricity that the retail company, EDP-SU, 
required. The PPAs covered a total of seven 
fossil fuel facilities with 4,630 MW of capacity 
and 26 hydroelectric facilities with 4,095 MW 
of capacity and effectively allowed the system to 
function as a VIM (“PPAs…,” p. 1–2, 4–6). This 
arrangement satisfied both companies, because 
it protected the generation companies, EDP 
and IP, from demand or price fluctuations and 
allowed the retail company, EDP-SU, to more 
easily guarantee consumers a constant supply 
of electricity without internal negotiation or a 
market. In order to fully launch the wholesale 
market, these contracts had to be dismantled so 
that less expensive but uncontracted generators 
would be compensated for their electricity 
rather than being crowded out by the contracted 
companies. The generation companies were 
reluctant to renegotiate their contracts 
because a highly competitive market auction 
for electricity would return a lower profit than 
the amount which their current PPAs entitled 
them. Thus, the Portuguese government needed 
to create new contracts which could both 
guarantee the companies the same revenue and 
force them to compete on price as part of the 
wholesale market (“ANNEX II …,” pp. 9–14). 
 The solution for the EDP facilities was to 
renegotiate the PPA contracts, called Costs for 
the Maintenance of Contractual Equilibrium 
(CMEC). The PPA contracts with IP were also 
adjusted but retained the label of PPA. These 
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new contracts force generation companies to 
sell their electricity on the auction market, 
but the Portuguese government guarantees 
that each facility receives a certain revenue 
level. Thus, the renegotiations were successful 
in creating an electricity auction because 
the electricity generated by the EDP and IP 
facilities will not be purchased if lower cost 
electricity is available. However, the persistence 
of the revenue guarantee allows the companies 
to maintain volume-risk protection: if the 
CMEC or adjusted PPA facility’s electricity is 
not needed to meet demand, the facility is still 
paid the contractual revenue. In this sense, 
the auction is artificial and the volume-risk 
protection arrangement causes the government 
debt to grow rapidly when there is no market 
revenue to help offset the revenue guarantee 
(“ANNEX II …,” pp. 12–18). 
 Exact amounts of contractual revenue 
payments are obscured in the facility income 
statements; however, the CEMC and adjusted 
PPA contracts do explicitly guarantee the 
companies a return of 8.5 percent, while 
the current market return is under five 
percent (“Rents…,” p. 7). More specifically, 
the Portuguese Secretary for Energy stated 
that more than half of the 2011 €1.486 
billion electricity deficit resulted from the 
CMEC payments to EDP. Liabilities from the 
adjusted PPAs with the IP companies were 
much smaller, contributing less than seven 
percent of the deficit incurred that year. These 
percentages can be generalized for each year in 
which a tariff deficit was incurred. Elimination 
of these guaranteed revenues is crucial 
because unlike the “special regime” payments, 
they do not enhance the sector or drive 
technological progress. Instead, guaranteed 
revenue payments serve only as unnecessary 
compensation for the pre-2007 EDP and IP 
generation facilities that must be paid for by 
taxpayers (“Rents…,” p. 14).
 A System of Problems
 Subsidizing wind and combined heat 
and power facilities, renegotiating the PPAs, 
and protecting consumers with a price ceiling 
were all necessary changes to enable Portugal 
to reach its 2020 goals, which it essentially 
achieved as of 2014. However, although each 
of these changes corrected a specific problem, 
together they have created a paradoxical system 
in which the desired success of subsidized 
technologies perpetuates the growth of tariff 
debt. Critics are correct in their assertion 
that subsidizing wind turbines is expensive, 
but an increase in low-cost renewable 
electricity-generation facilities also exerts 
downward pressure on prices. While lower 
prices are generally favorable for consumers, 
the contractual revenue guarantees, through 
the CMEC and adjusted PPAs, cause the 
government’s liabilities to increase when 
the price of electricity decreases. Yearly tariff 
deficits are projected to occur until 2017, but 
further changes to the system may help lessen 
the amount. CMEC will gradually expire by 
2027, and recent renegotiations should save 
the government €205 million by that year. 
Reductions in the FiTs to CHP subsidies are 
projected to save the government €1 billion 
from 2012 to 2025, and cuts to wind subsidies 
are projected to save €151 million (“Final…,” 
p. 10). However, the future cost cannot be 
fully eliminated because both special regime 
technologies and CMEC and adjusted PPA 
facilities are still entitled to some level of 
subsidy. By the end of 2015, the full cost of 
electricity will be passed on to consumers 
because the Energy System Regulatory 
Authority’s ability to set a price ceiling 
will be fully eliminated (“Electricity”). The 
Portuguese government believes these changes 
will enable it to pay off the tariff debt by 2020, 
but independent EU experts do not believe 
this will be achieved until 2030 (Linden et al., 
p. 31). Portugal is on track to meet its 2020 
goals; but it is clear that lower subsidies to new 
technologies, not guaranteeing revenue to the 
pre-2007 EDP and IP generation facilities, and 
more coordination in the unbundling process 
could have enabled the sector to achieve this 
success without incurring as much of the €4 
billion debt.
Forthcoming Changes:  
Hydroelectric Expansion and  
Interconnection
 The EU has not formally committed to 
an RES goal for 2030, but it has set a target of 
increasing overall use of RESs from 20 percent 
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to 27 percent and increasing the amount of 
electricity available to neighboring nations 
from 10 percent to 15 percent. If Portugal’s 
augmented burden increases accordingly, it 
will need to gain about 38 percent of its energy 
from RES, and the country has announced 
tentative plans to meet that target by increasing 
the amount of RES-Es to upwards of 60 percent 
(“EU Action on Climate”). Achieving this higher 
target is likely despite the halted expansion 
of subsidized RES-E technologies because 
construction of new hydroelectric installed 
capacity is in progress. If all of the planned 
hydroelectric facilities are completed, Portugal 
will be able to produce more electricity than it 
will need, and the increase in interconnection 
requirement will be the key for Portugal to 
become an exporter (Melo, p. 3).
 In 2007 the government announced the 
Portuguese National Program for Dams with 
High Hydropower Potential, which proposed 
construction of ten new dams to increase 
installed hydroelectric capacity from 5,000 
MW in 2014 to 7,000 MW. This plan to increase 
installed capacity was motivated by an EU-
wide assessment that identified Portugal as 
having over 50 percent untapped hydroelectric 
generation potential. The Portuguese 
government also gave EDP approval to build two 
additional dams and to expand six others. The 
exact figures of installed MW capacity at each 
facility will not be finalized until construction 
is complete; but with the additional EDP 
facilities, the total hydroelectric installed 
capacity is projected to exceed 9,000 MW. In 
total, 4,000 MW of new hydroelectric capacity 
could be installed; 3,000 MW of this total are 
planned to have pumped storage capability, 
a key factor discussed later. Nearly doubling 
hydro capacity should enable Portugal to meet 
the predicted 2030 EU RES goals; however, it 
is conceivable that not all of this potential will 
be realized because there are serious doubts 
about the facilities’ environmental impact and 
productivity (Melo, p. 3).
 Estimates of the amount of electricity that 
the new 4,000 MW of installed hydroelectric 
dams could generate vary widely between the 
government reports, the investing firms, and 
critics; but a simple analysis of the past five 
years can be used to forecast a reasonable 
estimate. The year 2012 was one of the driest 
years in Portugal, whereas 2010 was one of the 
wettest, so these can be used as the minimum 
and maximum expected generation levels from 
the existing 5,000 MW of installed capacity. The 
corresponding generation amounts were 5,824 
gigawatt-hours (GWh) and 14,869 GWh, or 
approximately one to three times the installed 
capacity amount in GWh. These estimates 
imply that if all the EDP facilities are built 
such that installed capacity increases to 9,000 
MW, the generation level will likely be between 
10,000 GWh and 27,000 GWh. That level of 
generation would account for 20 to 50 percent 
of 2014 electricity consumption (CEER, p. 50). 
Such a wide range clearly illustrates the risk of 
relying on nature-driven sources for electricity 
supply. This dam-building policy initiative 
is another example of what could be a major 
success if it comes to fruition as idealized but 
could become a costly liability if not.
The System as the Solution
 The Portuguese government’s subsidization 
of wind turbines and commission of new dams 
are both expensive investments in RES-E and 
highly weather dependent; but together the two 
technologies can offset each other’s weakness 
by improving reliability and decreasing 
system costs. Hydroelectric dam outputs are 
susceptible to fluctuation due to dry years or 
summers, whereas electricity generation via 
wind turbines is subject to daily fluctuations 
because it is generally windier at night than 
during the day. Demand for electricity is much 
higher during the day; but because electricity 
cannot be stored, the electricity generated 
by wind turbines at night sometimes goes 
unused. This is a major loss for consumers 
because they do not fully benefit from the 
low-cost electricity and, under the Portuguese 
subsidy scheme, wind turbine owners are still 
compensated. One solution that harnesses this 
extra electricity entails redirecting it off-peak at 
night to hydroelectric dams that have pumping 
capability in order to bring water that has already 
flowed downstream through the turbines 
back to the reservoir upstream of the dam. 
The pumping process is particularly helpful 
in dry years or seasons when water flow from 
upstream is limited and is useful in general as 
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the water in this reservoir can then be released 
whenever electricity is needed. However, the 
efficiency of the process is diminished because 
it uses some of the generated electricity to run 
the pump. By using off-peak wind-generated 
electricity, the total amount of electricity 
that the hydroelectric plant is able to put 
back into the system is increased; and wind-
generated electricity is better utilized. To fully 
power the pumping, one MW of hydroelectric 
capacity needs approximately 3.5 MW of wind 
capacity. As of 2014, it is estimated that 3,000 
MW of the future 9,000 MW will have pumping 
capabilities, and wind capacity is roughly 5,000 
MW. Therefore, the ratio of hydroelectric 
pumping capacity to wind capacity is only 
1 MW:1.67 MW, which implies an excess of 
hydroelectric capacity (Melo, p. 4). 
 Critics of the massive hydroelectric 
expansion argue that the optimal ratio would 
be met, rather than unnecessarily surpassed, 
if only the proposed updates and additions 
were pursued. These critics further argue that 
the environmental degradation that the new 
dams will cause far outweighs the benefit of 
additional electricity-generation capability 
(Melo, p. 5). To some degree these arguments 
are correct; however, increased hydroelectric 
capacity, even without pumping capacity or 
wind support, remains a highly productive 
and renewable energy–based addition to 
the electricity-generation system. Given the 
current moratorium on new wind installation, 
the ultimate completion of these new dams, 
which are scheduled to open after 2020, is 
essential to Portugal’s ability to meet its 2030 
obligations. Furthermore, Portugal has been a 
net importer of electricity from Spain. The new 
dams and additions will allow Portugal to fully 
meet its own electricity needs as well as provide 
excess capacity to export. This will benefit 
Portugal as well as the EU by moving closer to 
its fossil-fuel independent and interconnected 
ideal. 
Conclusion
 Since 2005, Portugal’s electricity 
sector has been drastically restructured 
and augmented with renewable generation 
technologies, which, in 2014, made the country 
an RES-E and market reform trailblazer but 
that also have left it mired in debt. Although 
some of this debt is a consequence of renewable 
subsidies, the liabilities to former PPA holders 
are larger, do not improve the sector in any 
way, and benefit the private companies at the 
taxpayers’ expense. For Portugal’s electricity 
sector to achieve financial solvency, it is 
essential that the former PPA payments are 
fully eliminated and that the proliferation of 
renewable technology, with lower subsidies, 
is allowed to continue. The new system of 
dams will enable Portugal not only to meet 
future RES-E requirements but also to surpass 
them and potentially profit from exporting 
excess electricity. Portugal faces a significant 
challenge in eliminating unnecessary payments 
in the electricity sector; but because the debt 
is a function of non-renewable factors and its 
elimination is feasible, Portugal’s electricity 
system is a beacon of proof that electricity 
systems with RES-E are both possible and 
affordable if created correctly.
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